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1. Research Background and Topic Choice 
The fact that I have worked for the Hungarian Government Debt 
Management Agency for almost two years between 2005 and 2006, and 
thereby I had the chance to get to know a number of – primarily risk 
management – aspects of debt management both in theory and in everyday 
practice has made a great impact on the choice of my doctoral field of 
research. Besides, my master’s thesis was also inspired by this topic, I 
focused on the possibility and risks of issuing a special government debt 
instrument, namely the inflation-linked bond. Furthermore, I participated 
in the National Scientific Students' Associations Conference where my 
paper based on this topic was awarded with first prize in the respective 
section. 
My primary goal at the beginning of the doctoral program was, within the 
wider field of government debt management, to model the optimal 
composition of debt portfolio. The trends and events in global economy, 
however, have drifted a second area into my horizons, that came not 
exclusively to my sight but also to the world’s: a more and more frequent 
discussion has started on the phenomenon of sovereign defaults. Once a 
dear colleague of mine gave me the book of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff titled This time is different, then I have made my final decision on 
the financial-economic phenomenon called sovereign default to be put in 
the focus of my doctoral thesis. Nevertheless, I also was surprised on myself 
being led back by this research topic to the inflation-linked bonds after 
almost a decade, shedding light on those instruments from aspects I was not 
even aware of when writing the my master’s thesis.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter presents the main 
features of government bonds and their markets. The purpose of this 
chapter is twofold. First, the relevance and significance of sovereign defaults 
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as research topic is emphasized by presenting government bond markets as 
the scene of buying and selling potential sovereign defaults. Second, the 
traditional interpretation of government bonds as simple and boring 
securities is criticized. 
The second chapter deals with conceptual questions of sovereign default. 
Besides presenting received definitions of international rating agencies, I 
also shed light on the elements of the definition in general. This is 
important because common definitions of default are convenient, but might 
obscure the fact that beyond debts a sovereign state has many other types of 
liabilities as well. 
The third chapter briefly outlines the history of sovereign defaults. I will 
show that such events occurred more frequently and in more countries than 
one might think - not only in South America, not only after military coups, 
not only in foreign currency. 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to systematize sovereign defaults, while the 
fifth chapter analyses the costs of sovereign defaults. Creditors of sovereign 
states – unlike those of private companies – have very limited legal 
possibilities to enforce debt repayments. Consequently, it is not enough to 
ask why sovereign defaults occur. A less common question is to be asked as 
well: Why do sovereign states repay their loans, why do not they default? It 
is widely accepted in the literature that the existence of sovereign debt is 
provided by the costs of default. By reviewing and systematizing the 
possible cost types, and by exploring the inconsistencies in the related 
literature, I will show that we do not know exactly the mechanisms ensuring 
the existence of sovereign debts. 
In the sixth chapter I analyse the relationship between sovereign defaults 
and the inflation-linked bonds. My premise is that the default risk of real 
obligation exceeds the default risk of nominal ones. 
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In the last chapter, I indicate further research topics to be analysed, and 
then summarize the result of the dissertation. 
 
Summarising, the dissertation seeks the answer for the following questions: 
 
1. Is there a unique definition for sovereign defaults? If not, what are the 
possible definitions, and what are the ingredients that all definition 
has to comprise?  
2. What are the types of sovereign defaults? From which aspects it is 
worth to classify the default events? 
3. Why do sovereign states repay their loans, why do not they default? 
Why the literature could not provide a consensual answer to this 
fundamental question?  
4. What is the relationship between the default risk of nominal and real 
bonds? If there is a theoretical difference between them, is it reflected 




2. Research Methodology 
In the different chapters of the dissertation either qualitative or quantitative 
methods and tools are being applied with respect to the traits of the research 
question in focus.  
In the first chapter of the thesis, upon the organization and analysis of 
individually collected statistical data it is being introduced how significant 
the treasury bond markets are, which, out of the financial markets are the 
ones closely related to the phenomena of sovereign defaults. 
Therefore, the chapter on the one hand underpins the practical relevance of 
the topic choice, on the other hand it draws the attention to the fact that 
although government bond markets represent the opinions and expectations 
of investors in relation to a certain sense of sovereign defaults, they do not 
tell much about the causes, consequences, and further attributes. The third 
chapter highlights the repeated timeliness of the topic, furthermore 
supports the importance of understanding the wider context. In this chapter 
I outline the history of sovereign defaults based upon historical factual data 
showing that sovereign default events happen often, in several ways, and 
under different conditions.  
In the second, fourth, and fifth chapters of the thesis basically aim at 
finding answers for questions that are subjects of qualitative analyses, inter 
alia the examination of the univocality of the sovereign default concept, or 
the typology definition possibilities of the latter. Here, from this aspect the 
methodology of making and analysing case studies take over. In the 
aforementioned chapters a broad and in-depth literature review was carried 
out, the results relevant to my research questions are not solely presented, 
but are also confronted to each other and are put on a common platform.  
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As a result of the analyses a number of causes and explanations are 
identified and formulated in order to the contradictions in the literature be 
resolved. 
The earlier chapters ground the conceptual system and theoretical 
framework, without which in chapter six it would not have been possible to 
discuss a narrower problem, i.e. the relationship of inflation-indexed bonds 
with sovereign defaults in a trustworthy way. 
As a first step, I show formally, how unexpected inflation and partial default 
scenarios could be compared as scenarios resulting in decreased real ex-post 
returns. With the help of the formal relationships, I illustrate the 
indifference curves of the two scenarios. Afterwards, I identify the factors 
that might influence the difference between nominal and real bonds’ yields, 
the so called break-even inflation. Based on the previous conclusions of the 
dissertation, the break-even inflation is decreased by the default risk 
premium difference of the nominal and indexed bonds. With the purpose of 
testing the appearance of this difference in market data, I estimate an 
econometric model on USA Treasury’s break-even inflation time series. I 
used an autoregressive model which allows for volatility to cluster, and 
among the possible specifications a chose an AR(4)-GARCH(1,1) model. 
For error distribution of the variance equation, I assumed t-distribution. 
The estimation results and the goodness of the model are tested with usual 
methods: among others, I tested the serial correlation of the residuals and 
the squared residuals, the distribution of the residuals and the significance 
of the estimated parameters. 
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3. Results of the Dissertation 
The results of the dissertation are structured as to follow the questions 
presented in Chapter 1, respectively.  
 
1. The abstract concept of sovereign defaults, and the consequences of 
such a default might have been clear and obvious in the past, but the 
concept is rather manifold than unique today.  
1.a. The most general – and the least concrete – definition of 
sovereign default is that a country does not fulfil its financial 
obligations. In accordance with this, I identified two ingredients 
that all default definition should contain: it has to be clarified 
which obligations are to be considered and what ‘not fulfilling’ 
means. However, nor of these ingredients is obvious if the debtor 
is a sovereign country. This finding sheds light on several 
inconsistencies in the literature. For example, if we take the 
common definition, where obligations are exclusively debt 
instruments, then most of the sovereign defaults have much more 
strategic aspect than it is usually discussed. 
2. When preparing a classification of sovereign defaults, I identified four 
factors that describe the main features of default events. These factors 
characterize the size and type of debt affected; furthermore the way and 
reason of not servicing the debt. It is easy to see that these four aspects 
are closely related to the ingredients of defaults’ definition presented in 
the previous point. In the dissertation, I determined different default 
groups according to all the four factors, and I also analysed why these 
groups are worth to be separated. My own classification is presented in 
Table 1.  
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Table 1. Classification of sovereign defaults 
Principle of 
classification Possible types 
Size of default 
 Total/partial 
 Groups by the absolute/relative size of debt 
affected 
 Groups by the size of creditor losses 
Type of debt affected  Local/foreign currency debt  Domestic/external debt 
Form of not fulfilling 
 Missed payment 
 Delayed payment 
 Distressed debt exchange 
Reason of not 
fulfilling 
 Inability to pay: illiquidity, insolvency  
 Unwillingness to pay: repudiation, strategic 
decision 
 
3. For the question, ‘Why do countries repay their loans?’ the common 
answer is ‘Because default has costs’. However, there is no consensus 
about which type of costs is dominant or how to measure these costs. I 





3.a. The forms of the defaults’ costs are changing in time: centuries 
ago, and even at the beginning of the 20th century it was usual 
that a sovereign default triggered military actions. Today, even 
the exclusion from financial markets is not necessarily 
experienced after a default.  
3.b. Most of the empirical studies, especially in case of the so-called 
reputational costs, do not separate properly the two main 
dimensions of costs. The dimensions I determined are the 
markets influenced by the costs and the mechanism of their 
emergence.  
3.c. Most of the empirical studies do not differentiate among default 
events in the dimensions I determined during the classification of 
defaults, and hence they examine a rather heterogeneous sample. 
  
4. If we approve the common argumentation that sovereigns are less risky 
in their domestic currency, partly because of their power to print 
money, then the default risk of inflation-indexed bonds must be higher 
than that of nominal bonds. From the point of view that the obligation 
cannot be eased via inflation, indexed bonds are akin to bonds issued 
in foreign currency. 
 
4.a. For an investor, unexpected inflation might cause similar losses in 
ex-post real return than partial default. This finding leads us back 
to result 1.a. in the sense that different default definitions 
determine different analysis frameworks. In case of zero-coupon 
type investments, the relationship between unexpected inflation 
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where   
D  = rate of partial default 
T = maturity 
e = annual expected inflation 
u = annual unexpected inflation 
 
4.b. Apart from expected inflation, inflation premium, and liquidity 
difference, break-even inflation may comprise default risk 
difference as well. Like liquidity difference, default risk difference 
decreases the break-even inflation and hence makes a negative 
bias as compared to inflation expectations. Formally: 
)()( nrnr LPLPDPDPIPIEBEI   
where   
BEI  = break-even inflation 
IE = inflation expectations 
IP = inflation premium 
DP = default premium 
LP = liquidity premium 
r = index denoting real bond 
n = index denoting nominal bond 
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4.c. Empirical results drawn from analysis on USA Treasury bond 
markets’ time series suggest that the default risk difference appear 
in the markets as well: after controlling for inflation and liquidity 
effects, CDS-spreads that represents default risks, have 
significant effect in the dynamics of break-even inflation. The 
estimated model was the following AR(4)-GARCH(1,1) 
specification: 
 tttt dBASdCDSdISdBEI 321   
ttttt udBEIdBEIdBEIdBEI   47362514   
ttt vhu  ; 
;12
2
1 1   tt huh t   
where  
BEI = break-even inflation 
IS = inflation swap rates 
CDS = CDS-spread 
BAS = difference between bid-ask spreads of real and nominal 
bonds 
d = denotes percentage change. 
 
The estimation output is summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Estimation output 
Dependent Variable: DBEI
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Student's t distribution
Sample (adjusted): 6 813
Included observations: 808 after adjustments 
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7)
t-distribution degree of freedom parameter fixed at 4
GARCH = C(8) + C(9)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(10)*GARCH(-1)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
DIS 0.8810 0.0231 38.1976 0.0000
DCDS 0.0076 0.0043 1.7689 0.0769
DBAS -0.0011 0.0007 -1.6462 0.0997
AR(1) -0.3368 0.0338 -9.9672 0.0000
AR(2) -0.1651 0.0362 -4.5599 0.0000
AR(3) -0.0283 0.0355 -0.7987 0.4244
AR(4) -0.0924 0.0340 -2.7141 0.0066
 Variance Equation
C 0.0000 0.0000 1.9281 0.0538
RESID(-1)^2 0.1014 0.0264 3.8412 0.0001
GARCH(-1) 0.8940 0.0250 35.8024 0.0000
R-squared 0.4861    Mean dependent var -0.0002
Adjusted R-squared 0.4822    S.D. dependent var  0.0144
S.E. of regression 0.0104    Akaike info criterion -6.6178
Sum squared resid 0.0864    Schwarz criterion -6.5597





Thus, the estimated relationships are: 
 tttt dBASdCDSdISdBEI 3001,0008,0881,0   
ttttt udBEIdBEIdBEIdBEI   4321 092,0028,0165,0337,0  




   tt huh t  
As an analysis and interpretation of the results we may observe 
that in the mean equation the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables responsible for the inflation, liquidity and default risk 
effects are all significant at 90 percent significance level. Among 
these variables, the most important in explaining the variance of 
the break-even inflation is the inflation swap rate. This is not 
surprising, the positive sign of 1 and its value close to 1 are in 
accordance with the close relationship between break-even 
inflation and inflation swap rates.  
The value of 2 and 3 (in absolute terms) are much lower and 
hence the liquidity and inflation effects appear to be less 
important. Unfortunately, the sign and the exact value of the 
coefficient 2 are cannot really be interpreted or explained, since 
the CDS-spreads are not measuring the default risk difference, 
they only represent the aggregate default risk premium of the 
nominal and the real bonds. The negative sign of the coefficient 
3 is a plausible result, but its value cannot be interpreted as exact 
liquidity premium, since bid-ask spreads are only one possible 
measures of liquidity. However, the scope of the analysis was not 
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measuring the liquidity and the default risk differences, but to 
demonstrate their existence. 
Analysis of the variance equation should be started by observing 
that the sign of each coefficient is positive, which is a prerequisite 
for the conditional variance to be nonnegative, thus for the 
GARCH-specification to be reasonable. The fact that the sum of 
the ARCH- and the GARCH- coefficients is close to one 
suggests that shocks die out very slowly, which is a common 
feature in financial time series. All in all, the GARCH(1,1) 
specification shows that the volatility of the dBEI variable 
depends on the volatility of the previous period, and implicitly on 
earlier volatilities as well.  
Explanatory power of the model with R2-value at around 48 
percent is rather moderate. This is in line with expectations, since 
the liquidity and default effect are only represented and not 
measured exactly in the specification. 
Summarising the results of this chapter, they are not 
contradictory to my expectations, that besides inflation and 
liquidity effects, market break-even inflation may comprise the 




4. Questions for Further Consideration 
Taking the results of the thesis into account the following further research 
directions could be identified. As a result of the examination of the 
definition issues around sovereign default it was concluded that the 
definition of the default event is not unambiguous at all. To put it the other 
way around, between default and non-default there is no clean-cut 
borderline. Sovereign default as a concept goes through an evolution just as 
the concept of money. Money used to be identifiable with gold or other 
precious metals. Nowadays, we differentiate monetary base and other 
monetary aggregates; cash and quasi-money, and so forth. It is worth 
further researching the following questions: What would the levels of 
sovereign default be? What would the near-defaults be? When and under 
what circumstances the expert’s opinion would consider a country to be on 
the brink of sovereign default? 
The relationship between inflation-indexed bonds and sovereign defaults 
might also be a subject for further consideration. The existence of default 
risk difference between nominal and real bonds could also be examined in 
other periods or markets, thereby extending the research in space and time. 
It would be desirable – however more complicated – to measure that effect.  
Beyond the decomposition of break-even inflation, the problem could also 
be captured by looking into the connection between the general default risk 
of some country and the weight of its inflation-indexed debt in the debt 
portfolio. It is linked to the latter train of thought that inflation risk does 
not only change in the case of inflation-indexed debt, but also when joining 
a monetary union. Will the default risk increase when joining such a union? 
Will the inflation risk partially be transformed into default risk? Those 
questions might become particularly interesting for a candidate country and 
for its creditors as well. 
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